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Executive Summary 
The focus of this report is on implementing institutional arrangements for the efficient allocation 
and management of water.  The report builds on an earlier report entitled Robust Separation – 
a search for a generic framework to simplify registration and trading of interests in natural 
resources (Young and McColl, 2002), and expands a recent policy forum article in the Australian 
Economic Review  (Young and McColl, 2003).  We release the report to assist those involved in 
the present CoAG processes pursuing the National Water Initiative that Australia’s 
Governments have collectively committed to. 
Water is an input into human use including economic production and recreation activities that 
generate many externalities.  It also provides many valuable ecosystem services only partially 
captured in the market.  Institutional arrangements are required that are dynamically efficient 
and low cost, and robust enough to withstand the test of time.  Robust administrative 
arrangements are characterised by the lack of a need for change. 
The Biophysical challenge 
Because Australian surface water supplies tend to be highly variable, we have invested large 
amounts in the development of dams and distribution systems.  As a result, very few of our 
surface water and groundwater systems, in any way, resemble their natural state – we have re-
arranged them to remove a large amount of variability.  The reality is that the landscapes and 
rivers that now characterise much of Australia are very different to those in place a century ago.   
Many of the most serious problems associated with catchment, river and aquifer management 
stem from a past failure to understand the hydrology of groundwater connectivity and the 
generally long time these groundwater systems take to respond to changes in land and water 
use.  Most Australian rivers are inextricably connected to surrounding groundwater aquifers that 
supply much of their base flow. 
There is much debate and misconception about the current status of Australia’s water 
resources.  Biophysical assessment – almost devoid of economic analysis – reveals an adverse 
report card.  As a result, a process known as the “Living Murray” process has been implemented 
to consider the merits of enhancing environmental flows in the River Murray System with a view 
to improving the environmental health of this system.   
The area under consideration can be described as the Southern Connected River Murray 
System.  This consists of the River Murray in South Australia, the Darling River and its Ana 
Branch below the Menindee Lakes, the River Murray itself, the Murrumbidgee System and all 
Victorian tributaries except those in the Mallee.  It does not include the Lachlan River in NSW. 
Re-allocation of substantial volumes of consumptive use water to the environment is being 
contemplated.  Volumes of 350 GL, 750 GL and to around 18% or 1,500 GL have been 
proposed as reference points to facilitate consideration of the options.  As discussions and 
analysis proceeds, it is becoming clearer that the most appropriate way to proceed is to focus 
on deliverable outcomes rather than specified volumes.  While there is a focus on the River 
Murray, many of the issues and concepts explored in this report are equally relevant to other 
river and groundwater systems.  Such discussions and such processes have a major effect on 
investment and on community welfare. ROBUST REFORM 
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Hydrological reality 
Australia has a plethora of water licensing systems onto which mechanisms for managing 
externalities, rationing scarcity and trading have been bolted.  Differences in approaches among 
States are dramatic.  The case for introducing a nationally consistent water entitlement and 
allocation system is compelling.  Consistency reduces transaction costs and opens up economic 
opportunity that is characterised by opportunities for permanent gain rather than the pursuit of 
the arbitrage opportunities associated with ongoing reform. 
While there have been very few licences issued for some time, recognition of the fact that many, 
where only partially used, led during the 1990s to the introduction of a “cap” on diversions at 
1993/94 levels of development for NSW, Victoria, and SA.  This was coupled with a decision to 
introduce trading mechanisms to encourage economically inefficient water users to sell water 
entitlements and allocations to economically efficient water users. 
Definition of the Cap on diversions is complex and there is considerable variation from reach to 
reach in the way diversions are measured and the licences that permit these diversions are 
defined.  The Cap is a dynamic mechanism and provides for greater water usage in some years 
and lower use in other years.  When the Cap was set in place, it represented about 75 % of the 
estimated natural river flows for the River Murray System in 1993/94.  The introduction of a 
Cap on diversions was seen as a first step in establishing management systems to achieve healthy 
rivers and sustainable consumptive uses.  The introduction of trading has also meant that 
governments have been able to stop issuing new entitlements without the surrender of an 
existing licence. 
Of particular importance for any assessment of the amount of water needed to restore health 
to rivers, like the River Murray, is the question of how well entitlements and allocations align 
with the hydrological processes.  The accounting systems used are not robust.  They do not 
guarantee that when one person or one process uses more water, another uses less.  Significant 
omissions include the influence of land-use changes that reduce recharge and run-off to the 
river, as well as the impact of increases in water-use efficiency on river flow.  Other important 
omissions include the effects on river flow of salinity interception schemes, and development of 
inter-connected groundwater resources.  As a result, allocations to some classes of irrigators 
and or the environment continue to decline.  How much of the impact of these omissions is 
borne by irrigators in the form of decreased allocations and how much is borne in the form of 
decreased in-stream flow is unknown. 
The table below provides a rough estimate of the potential consequences of these omissions for 
irrigators and the Southern Connected River Murray System.  These estimates have been 
derived, using 1993/94 as a baseline, without the benefit of access to sophisticated groundwater 
models.  We expect that more sophisticated modelling is likely to result in significant revision of 
these estimates.  Additional hydrological considerations—in particular, the impacts of climate 
change, of farm dam development and of forest fires—have not been considered.  (Work under 
contract to the Murray Darling Basin Commission is presently under way to provide more 
precise estimates.  Nevertheless, we believe that these estimates are of the right order of 
magnitude.) ROBUST REFORM 
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Estimated reduction in mean annual flow and available seasonal allocations of design omissions in the 
entitlement systems used to allocate water in the River Murray Basin (baseline 1993/94) 
Design Omission   Net effect 
Reduced drainage and groundwater returns to the River resulting from water use 
efficiency savings 
a) 
- 723 GL 
Reduction in water yield from catchment land-use changes like increased forestry 
and farm dam development
 b) 
- 600 GL 
Reduced groundwater flow to the River as a result of increased installation and 
operation of Salinity Interception Schemes
 c) 
-20 GL 
Reduced groundwater flow to the River from increased groundwater use
 d)  -349 GL 
Estimated net reduction in mean river flow and allocations to 
irrigators 
-1,692 GL 
Notes a) to d) refer page 22 
Under current arrangements, the effects outlined in the table above are managed via a variety of 
mechanisms.  These include the mechanisms used to define bulk licences, the mechanisms used 
to assign allocations to general security licence holders in New South Wales and sales water 
allocations in Victoria, restrictions on surface water trading among regions and restrictions on 
groundwater trading. 
Estimates of the volume of water access entitlements needed to secure environmental flows 
depend very much upon the degree of transparency associated with management of the 
omissions included in the above table.  Three approaches are possible: 
•  These design omissions can be removed via the introduction of a robust entitlement and 
allocation system;  
•  Market mechanisms can be used to remove their effects; or, as is presently the case,  
•  Administrative mechanisms can be used to minimise their effects on the River. 
Communication of the logic in purchasing, say, 1,500 GL of entitlement from irrigators and 
reducing allocations to a subset of them by a further 1,500 GL is, to say the least, likely to prove 
challenging.  If, however, entitlements are aligned with the hydrological realities of water use 
then this difficult communication challenge and resulting adverse effects on investment could be 
avoided.   
Finally, the introduction of both the Cap and relatively constrained trading has activated unused, 
dozer and sleeper licences.  Removing current impediments to trading has the potential to 
further activate unused water entitlements, and add to the difficulties of managing within the Cap 
in some parts of the system.  Clearly, rather than a Cap on diversions, in a robust system the 
Cap would be a cap on entitlements not on diversions. ROBUST REFORM 
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The Policy challenges 
Essentially, the policy challenges now faced by Australian water resource and environmental 
managers collapse to: 
•  The search for a robust set of institutional arrangements, defined in the broadest sense 
possible, to enable the efficient allocation and management of water resources and both 
consumptive and non-consumptive water use through time; and 
•  The search for an efficient and equitable transition pathway to such a set of institutional 
arrangements. 
A Robust system 
As well as being consistent with the hydrological realities of water use, a robust system would 
need to facilitate: 
•  Resolution of resource allocation between consumptive use and the environment, among 
consumptive users, and of issues related to distribution and use;  
•  Secure, economically efficient and low cost trading and administration; 
•  Assignment of risks making it clear where responsibility lies, under what circumstances 
compensation is due, and specifying the processes for obtaining redress; and 
•  Management of externalities associated with use—the interests of third parties, future 
generations and the environment—with minimum controversy. 
A robust system also must pass the conventional tests of efficiency and fairness.  For this to 
occur in a changing world, the system must not only be built on a solid conceptual foundation, 
but also be flexible and adaptive, transparent and equitable. 
Important characteristics of a robust system include: 
•  Mechanisms balancing market and non-market uses as they change through time; 
•  Specification of water access entitlements, allocations and use conditions in a manner 
that is consistent with hydrological realities; 
•  Arrangements that enable trade between surface and groundwater systems and the 
development of markets for delivery or channel capacity in peak demand periods and, 
also, markets that allow people to trade in salinity impacts; and 
•  Clear pricing policies and associated arrangements that facilitate the management of 
externalities. 
In several States, the reform processes underway are consistent with many of these 
characteristics.  New South Wales, for example, has begun the process of separating access 
entitlements from use entitlements and all States have begun the process of pricing reform. ROBUST REFORM 
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A transition pathway 
Sequencing 
When considering securing water entitlements for the environment and moving to a robust 
water entitlement, allocation and use licence system, a number of transitional issues arise.  
There are sequencing opportunities and traps.  Implement reform in the wrong order and some 
reforms become impossible and the cost of the entire reform process rises significantly.  The 
presence of existing market impediments, even given the comparative absence of externality 
cost obligations, means that the value of water access entitlements, allocations and use licences 
are less than they would otherwise be. 
As a general rule, it will be less costly for governments to acquire additional water to enhance 
the environment before impediments to permanent water trading are removed and before a 
new robust water access entitlement and allocation system is put in place.   
In all fully allocated systems, the further development of seasonal allocations (temporary trading) 
coupled with a freeze on the expansion of access entitlement (permanent trading) could be used 
to limit arbitrage opportunities until robust accounting systems are put in place.  If arrangements 
are not put in place to ensure seamless alignment of the number of unit shares in the system 
with its hydrological capacity, ongoing problems can be expected to emerge.  As an absolute 
minimum, water use should be defined in “net” not “gross” terms and arrangements should be 
put in place to ensure that the effects of land use changes like forestry development and farm 
dam construction are offset.  The effects of activating unused groundwater and surface water 
access entitlements also need to be accounted for. 
Securing entitlements for the environment 
There are a number of relatively cost-effective options of securing water access entitlements for 
the environment including pro rata reductions, acquisition of water licences using market-like 
processes, compulsory acquisition and contracts involving investment by government in 
infrastructure upgrades. 
The option or mix of options chosen to secure more water for the environment will mainly 
depend on the volumes of water needed, the proposed timelines for securing them, the 
expected flow of available finance, and the institutional arrangements set in place to hold them.  
The mix of options chosen will also depend upon decisions about management of this water.  It 
is possible that the best arrangement will involve separation of the process of securing and 
holding this water from arrangements for its subsequent management in a manner that will 
ensure that it is subsequently deployed to achieve the most beneficial environmental outcomes.  
How these aspects will be dealt with will be for the relevant governments to resolve in 
consultation with stakeholders and the community.   
If market and market-like mechanisms are used, then the financial resources necessary will need 
to be provided by governments.  Determining how much of the cost of securing environmental 
water should be borne by water licence holders and how much by the rest of the community is 
a distributional policy issue.  In recognition of the merits of securing water at current market 
prices, operationally any first tranche could be purchased up-front.  The size and speed of 
program implementation should then be determined by the level of funds provided by ROBUST REFORM 
 
Policy and Economic Research Unit  CSIRO Land and Water  Page 8 
governments and the environmental benefits being achieved, rather than by an up-front policy 
commitment to secure a particular volume. 
There is a highly attractive opportunity to use a tender process to secure the first tranche of 
water required.  Modelled on the current $800-1,000 million Telstra Share Buy Back Tender, all 
irrigators could be invited to indicate the minimum price that they would be prepared to sell 
different proportions of their access entitlements for.  A buy-back price declared for each type 
of water licence and all those who tendered a price less than the buy-back price selected would 
then be paid the buy-back price for the volume of water they offered. 
Reform program 
In summary, the reform program can be undertaken as a series of sequential steps as follows: 
1.  Separate water use licences from water access entitlements as is happening in NSW and 
is foreshadowed;  
2.  Facilitate temporary market trading with appropriate trading rules and periodically 
revised exchange rates with a focus on increasing opportunities for internet trading, 
lowering transaction costs and reducing settlement times;  
3.  Temporarily freeze expansion of the permanent trade of access entitlements until the 
access component of each licence is converted into a shares defined in a manner that 
defines use in “net” not “gross” terms and accounts for the effects of all forms of land 
use change that reduce water yield and the interconnectedness of ground and surface 
water systems or, alternatively, tagging all permanent trades so that it is clear that any 
future changes in exchange rates, etc would be at the risk of the person who purchases 
the entitlement; 
4.  Decide on the volume of water to be secured for environmental services, the methods 
to be used to source it, and the approach to management of such water. 
5.  Put in place institutional arrangements to hold “new” environmental allocations and 
manage the long-term sustainable relationship between environmental flows and 
consumption at both the catchment and basin levels; 
6.  Decide on the most appropriate way to convert the access component of each licence 
into access entitlement shares, and remove impediments to the permanent trade in 
access entitlements with appropriate trading rules and periodically revised exchange 
rates;  
7.  Provide for the development of markets for salinity and other water quality impacts, for 
channel capacity through the issuance of shares and allocations, and for the development 
of secondary water market products; and finally 
8.  Allow conversion of all entitlements to resultant robust entitlement, allocation and 
trading system. ROBUST REFORM 
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Governance 
Institutional separation of access entitlements, allocations and use conditions enables 
management at different scales with management of interactions among them largely via market 
rather than administrative processes.  Significantly, robust systems seek to internalise problems 
so that those finding an administrative flaw or omission seek to fix the problem rather than 
exploit it to the disadvantage of others.  This is most efficiently achieved by locating 
responsibility and accountability for resolving problems at the scale that they occur.  Where 
problems occur at multiple scales, nested administrative arrangements that assign responsibility 
and accountability to each administrative level tend to be more dynamically efficient. 
Water access entitlements therefore need to be defined by catchment or supply system, 
allowing climate change and other similar risks to be collectively shared among the pool of 
shareholders interested in the long-term fate of the water supply system.  Generally, the 
inevitable trade-offs between environmental and economic objectives are most efficiently 
managed at the catchment level nested within formally assigned limits set by Basin managers who 
need to ensure that these trade-offs do not compromise the interests of other upstream and 
downstream water users, and the needs of the environment. 
Annual allocations can be made only after the quantity of water available for consumptive use is 
established.  In complex systems, like those in the Murray Darling Basin, the quantity available 
for use will depend, among other things, upon the extent of the transmission losses.  Exchange 
rates will have to be varied regularly by a river manager at the reach level as market and 
biophysical systems change.   
It is also important to consider how any water access entitlements secured for the environment 
are managed.  A preferred option is for all water secured for the environment to be placed in an 
independent Basin-wide trust empowered to maximise environmental outcomes.  This could 
involve selling some environmental allocations in drought periods when the price of a seasonal 
allocation tends to be very high and environmental needs are less and then using the resultant 
money to buy back more water in wetter periods when the irrigator demand for water is less.  
This counter-cyclic trading opportunity could even be used to gradually increase the 
environmental entitlements.  The result would be a more efficient social outcome – increased 
environmental outcomes and increased opportunities for the irrigation sector.   
Use conditions and obligations to others and to the environment occur at two levels: basin-
wide, associated with distant downstream impacts; and local, characterised by impacts on 
neighbouring businesses, the local community and local environments.  Efficient management 
basin-wide requires assignment of outcome performance targets (both quantity and quality) that 
downstream local water-use managers are both responsible and accountable for delivering.  In 
most Australian States, the logical local water-use manager is either the catchment management 
authority or local government authorities appropriately scaled and resourced and with 
boundaries aligned to coincide with catchment boundaries.  These use-control arrangements 
need not be administered centrally.  ROBUST REFORM 
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Concluding comment 
Many of the building blocks and steps identified in this report are already in place.  As Australia 
embraces the challenge and opportunity given to it by CoAG, it will be important to identify the 
fundamental design characteristics of robust water entitlement, allocation and use control.  
These include arrangements that ensure continuous alignment between entitlements and the 
quantity of water available for use, full specification and assignment of risk, and separation or 
removal of use control from entitlement definition.  If the reforms now being pursued by 
Australia get the fundamental design characteristics right, as a result we should have a set of 
robust arrangements capable of withstanding the test of time. 
Choice of procedural process and sequencing, and style of communication with irrigators is 
critically important.  As governments begin the process of securing water for the environment, 
irrigators will be less inclined to leave water in the river.  At present, around 10 – 20% of water 
is neither traded nor used!  Failure to address the fundamentals of system design could result in 
outcomes that are worse than those already expected.   
Our estimates suggest that the sum of the flow losses and allocation reductions caused by 
existing hydrological flaws are as great as the volumes under consideration for return to the 
environment.  If irrigators understand that, in parallel with the processes being put in place to 
secure additional access entitlements for the environmental, a sub-set of them will have their 
allocations reduced by a similar amount because of the effects of land use change, increased 
water-use efficiency, salinity interception and groundwater development, etc.  then there is no 
problem.  If, however, they are not aware of this, administrators may face a major 
communication challenge. ROBUST REFORM 
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Robust Reform - Implementing robust institutional arrangements to 
achieve efficient water use in Australia 
M.D. Young and J.C. McColl,  
Policy and Economic Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water
1 
“A key focus of the National Water Initiative will be to implement a robust framework for water access entitlements that 
encourages investment and maximises the economic value created from water use, while ensuring that there is sufficient 
water available to maintain healthy rivers and aquifers.  … .  Under the National Water Initiative, jurisdictions will establish a 
robust, transparent regulatory water accounting framework that protects the integrity of entitlements.”   
Council of Australian Governments, 29
th August 2003. 
1  Introduction 
The focus of this report is on implementing institutional arrangements for the efficient allocation 
and management of water.  The report builds on an earlier report entitled "Robust Separation – 
a search for a generic framework to simplify registration and trading of interests in natural 
resources" (Young and McColl, 2002).  It expands a recent policy forum article in the Australian 
Economic Review (AER) (Young and McColl, 2003).  This latter article briefly examined a 
number of conceptual challenges and uncertainties associated with the management of the 
Murray-Darling Basin Cap.  Among other things, it proposes a sequence for their resolution in 
conjunction with the implementation of a robust entitlement and allocation system.  Following 
the receipt of considerable constructive comment on the AER article, this report seeks to 
expand and clarify many of the points raised.  Opportunity to explore some of the consequences 
of the recent Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) announcement of a National Water 
Initiative is taken.
2  We release the report to assist those involved in the present CoAG 
processes pursuing the water reform agenda committed to by Australia’s Governments. 
Water is an input into human use including economic production and recreation activities that 
generate many externalities, and also provides many valuable ecosystem services only partially 
captured in the market.  The challenge, across space and through time is to find the most 
efficient and equitable way to deploy the nation’s water resources in economic and human use 
and in the maintenance of environmental processes.  Institutional arrangements are required 
that are dynamically efficient and low cost, and robust in an institutional sense.  These 
arrangements must be able to optimally manage and deliver benefits arising from consumptive 
uses, in providing ecosystem services arising from non-consumptive uses, and in addressing the 
full suite of externalities that result from water use.  When they are compromised, investment is 
less efficient than it otherwise would be and community welfare is less than it could be. 
                                            
1   This report has benefited tremendously from the opportunity to discuss the issues identified with members of 
the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists and also our colleagues Darla Hatton MacDonald, John 
Radcliffe, Geoff Edwards, Alistair Watson and John Freebairn.  We have also benefited from the opportunity 
to discuss the ideas presented with many irrigators and present them at a number of conferences and 
seminars.  In particular, we would like to acknowledge the comprehensive comments and criticisms of early 
drafts made by the Board of Murrumbidgee Irrigation and Clarke Ballard both helped us to communicate the 
concepts presented in this report with greater clarity. 
2   Copies of the CoAG communiqué committing Australia to a National Water Initiative can be downloaded 
from http://www.dpmc.gov.au/docs/coag290803.cfm ROBUST REFORM 
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It is often stated that Australia is the driest inhabited continent in the world.  While factually 
correct, from a policy perspective this statement can be misleading.  Australia ranks 40th out of 
180 nations in access to renewable water resources per capita (UNESCO, 2003).  From an 
economic perspective, the Nation’s water resources are abundant.  Thomas and his colleagues, 
in a thorough assessment of the role of water in the economy, could find little to suggest that 
water is a constraint upon opportunities for economic growth (Australian Academy of 
Technological Sciences and Engineering,1999).  Water shortage is not the issue, rather 
inadequate water resource management systems.  What matters economically is the breadth of 
opportunities to combine capital, labour and natural resources.  The challenge is to find ways to 
harmonise contests among environmental and economic objectives to the benefit of people 
living today and those yet to born. 
2  Biophysical, economic and institutional challenges 
2.1  Biophysical 
Unlike water in many other parts of the world, Australian surface water supplies tend to be 
highly variable.  For example, flow variability in the Darling River is 4,700:1 while flow variability 
in the Amazon is 1.13:1.  Consequently, to endeavour to manage this extreme flow variability, 
Australia has invested large amounts in the development of dams and distribution systems.  
Storage capacity across the entire Murray Darling System is 50% higher than the average run-off 
of all rivers.
3  As a result, very few of our surface water and groundwater systems, in any way, 
resemble their natural state – we have re-arranged them to remove a large amount of variability.  
As Watson (2003) observes, references to what existed prior to 1788 lack an understanding of 
the reality of the landscapes that now characterise Australia.  The Nation would benefit from a 
discussion to identify what we have already lost irreversibly, what is worth protecting if we act 
wisely and quickly, and what will require a trade off between environmental and economic 
objectives.   
Australians incorrectly perceive rivers as narrow conduits.  Many of our most serious problems 
in water management stem from a past failure to understand the hydrology of groundwater 
connectivity and the generally long time these systems take to respond to changes in land and 
water use.  In fact, most Australian rivers are inextricably connected with a surrounding 
groundwater aquifer.  These groundwater aquifers supply most of the base flow.  In many cases, 
these groundwater bodies are highly saline.  Recent work by the National Land and Water 
Resources Audit has classified groundwater systems into local, intermediate and regional 
(NLWRA, 2001).  When perturbed, local groundwater systems typically return to a new 
equilibrium within 20 years and intermediate systems within 100 years, while regional aquifer 
systems, which dominate the Murray-Darling Basin, typically take over 500 years to express 
themselves fully in a river.   
                                            
3   Source:   Don Blackmore, presentation to SA Parliamentary Forum on River Murray, Adelaide, February, 2003. ROBUST REFORM 
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There is much debate and misconception about the current status of Australia’s water 
resources.  Biophysical assessment – almost devoid of economic analysis – reveals an adverse 
report card.  Two key biophysical observations that are driving political debates include 
statements that: 
•  by 2020, unless significant action is taken, it is expected that River Murray salinity at Morgan 
in South Australia over 50% of the time will fail to meet World Health Organisation 
desirable drinking standards (MDBMC, 1999); and 
•  between 20 and 40% of irrigation water needs to be returned to the stem of the River 
Murray so that there is at least moderate probability that it can be restored as a healthy 
working river (Jones et al., 2002). 
As a result of these and many other observations, a process known as the “Living Murray” 
process has been implemented to consider the merits of enhancing environmental flows in the 
River Murray System with a view to improving the environmental health of this system.  The 
area under consideration can be described as the Southern Connected River Murray System.  
This consists of the River Murray in South Australia, the Darling River and its Ana Branch below 
the Menindee Lakes, the River Murray itself, the Murrumbidgee System and all Victorian 
tributaries except those in the Mallee.  It does not include the Lachlan River in NSW.   
Through the Living Murray process, re-allocation of substantial volumes of consumptive use 
water to the environment is being contemplated and CoAG has now announced $500 million of 
“new” funding for this purpose.  But, no decision on how much water to secure or how to go 
about securing water for the environment has been made.  Nevertheless, volumes of 350 GL, 
750 GL and to around 1,500 GL have been chosen as reference points to facilitate consideration 
of the options and focus analysis (MDBMC, 2002).  1,500 GL of water represents around 18% of 
the mean amount of water presently consumed in the Southern Connected River Murray 
System.  More recently, it has been stressed that there is a need for an outcome-focused 
approach.  It also needs to be recognised that these volumes relate increases in net flow against 
the 1993/94 CAP benchmark.   
Recent statements and actions by politicians suggest they perceive the community as willing to 
support the use of significant public funding to address many of these biophysical problems.  
Indeed, the language used in the recent CoAG communiqué suggests that market-based and 
market-like processes will be used to reduce reduce consumptive use.  Many commentators 
seem aware that the business case for fixing systems like the River Murray is compelling (Young 
et al., 2002).  Leave more water in the river, manage flow for both market and for non-market 
benefit, remove flaws in allocation systems and impediments to trading, and Gross Domestic 
Product will increase.  Leaving more water in the River Murray and decreasing salinity impacts is 
a profitable investment.  Many irrigation communities fear that personal welfare will decline as a 
result of environmental flow enhancement.  The extent to which these fears become reality will 
depend upon implementation process and detail.  A major factor influencing this outcome will be 
choice of the mechanisms used to secure the water needed to enhance river health and the 
processes followed.  If these processes are perceived to be fair then much more rapid progress 
can be expected. ROBUST REFORM 
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2.2  Economic and institutional 
Australia has a plethora of water licensing systems onto which mechanisms for managing 
externalities, rationing scarcity and trading have been bolted.  If trading is to become the norm, 
then the case for introducing a nationally consistent water entitlement and allocation system is 
compelling.  Consistency reduces transaction costs and opens up economic opportunity.  
Differences in approaches among States are dramatic.  Even the terminology used is inconsistent.  
Queensland and SA call access entitlements “allocations,” Victoria and NSW only use the word 
“allocation” to define the quantity received in a specific year (Carmichael and Cummins, 2001).
4 
Within the Murray- Darling Basin, some New South Wales (NSW) licences allow unused 
periodic allocations to be carried forward to the next year, while in those parts of Victoria and 
South Australia (SA) relating to the River Murray, “use-it or lose-it” policies are in place.  
Amongst other things, this means that unfettered allocation trading among States would be 
problematic as this opens up the opportunity for SA and Victorian irrigators to bank allocations 
in NSW.  Other examples of differences in approach, which resemble the “railway gauge” 
problem, include a foreshadowed NSW guarantee of entitlement reliability for the period of 
each 10 year water plan, while other States allow for uncompensated changes at any time.  
Licences in NSW are periodic, while in SA and Queensland they are in perpetuity.  Victoria is 
the only State providing preferential access to so-called “sales” water.   
During the 1990s, recognition by the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC) that 
water resources are limited led to: 
•  Capping - the introduction of a “cap” on diversions at 1993/94 levels of development for 
NSW, Victoria, and SA; and 
•  Trading – the introduction of mechanisms to encourage economically inefficient water users 
to sell water entitlements and allocations to economically efficient water users.   
2.2.1  The Cap 
In 1995,the MDBMC decided that preventing any increase in diversions from the Basin was 
essential to arrest further decline in both river health and the security of supply to existing 
water users, and introduced an interim Cap defined as  “the volume of water that would have 
been diverted under 1993/94 levels of development.  In unregulated rivers, this Cap may be 
expressed as an end-of-valley flow regime”.  The Cap was subsequently confirmed permanent, 
effective from 1
st July 1997.  Any new developments were to be dependent on obtaining the 
required water by improving water-use efficiency or by purchasing water from existing 
developments.   
Definition of the Cap is complex and varies on a reach by reach basis in a manner that makes 
discussion of overall arrangements problematic.
5  Importantly, each limit is on the volume of 
water that may be diverted from the river in any period, not a limit on the number or form of 
                                            
4   In this report, we define any arrangement that can be expected to deliver a stream of seasonal volumes for use 
as an “access entitlement” and any volume that a person may extract within a season as an “allocation.” 
5   Full details can be found in a 60 page MDBC document that sets out the formulas to be used to define the 
relationship between use and the cap for each reach.   ROBUST REFORM 
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entitlements to extract or harvest water that may be issued.  Incorrectly, many people assume 
that arrangements for their area also apply in all other areas.  This is not the case.  There is 
considerable variation among States and between irrigation districts in the way diversions are 
measured and the licences that permit these diversions.  In some reaches and for some but not 
all water supply systems, the Cap is defined in a manner that accounts for surface returns, in 
others it does not.   
The Cap in any year is the volume of water that would have been used with the infrastructure 
(pumps, dams, channels, areas developed for irrigation, management rules, etc.) that existed in 
1993/94, assuming similar climatic and hydrologic conditions to those experienced in a year in 
question.  The Cap therefore is a dynamic mechanism and provides for greater water usage in 
some years and lower use in other years.  The details of the Cap are provided as Schedule F – 
Cap on Diversions, to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement.  More specific reach and system 
details are available (MDBC, 2002).   
When the Cap was set in place, it represented about 75 % of the estimated natural river flows 
for the River Murray System in 1993/94.  The introduction of a Cap on diversions was seen as a 
first step in establishing management systems to achieve healthy rivers and sustainable 
consumptive uses.  The allocation process, however, is more complex than this.  When 
determining how much sales water in Victoria and how much general security water is to be 
offered in each season in NSW, consideration is also given to the quantity of water in storage, 
hydropower supply commitments and environmental needs.  In extreme circumstances, 
allocation to high security entitlements may be reduced.  In areas where the sum of entitlements 
is greater than the local Cap, trading restrictions are also used to limit water use.  These 
restrictions also mean that allocations to general security users and to those who use sales 
water are greater than they otherwise would be. 
With robust allocation and accounting systems for both water quantity (including river flow) and 
quality (particularly salt) in place, the trade-offs among actions to minimise the mobilisation or 
movement of salt into rivers (revegetation of catchment recharge areas, salt interception 
schemes) and impact on river flows and river salinity (dilution effect) can be left to market 
mechanisms.  When they are not in place, a complex array of administrative arrangements are 
needed. 
Of particular importance for any assessment of the amount of water needed to restore health 
to rivers, like the River Murray, is the question of how well entitlements to divert water from 
the system align with the hydrological processes as land and water use changes.  An overview of 
critical processes is provided in Figure 1 below.  Changes in hydrological processes in solid blue 
are well accounted for in current allocation systems, changes in hydrological processes 
represented by a dotted blue line are accounted for in some but not all systems, and changes in 
hydrological processes in black are omitted from virtually all systems.  This means that it is 
possible for a water user to change the way water is used and, hence, the volume of water left in 
the river without affecting their entitlement.  Before going further, it is necessary to stress that 
many administrators and system managers are aware of these omissions and are using trading 
restrictions and seasonal allocation processes as a way to contain their impacts. 
Significant omissions include the influence of land-use changes that reduce groundwater recharge 
and run-off to the river, as well as the impact of increases in water-use efficiency on river flow.  
Other important omissions include the effects on river flow of salinity interception schemes, and 
development of inter-connected groundwater resources.   ROBUST REFORM 
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2.2.2  Water-use efficiency and reduced return flows to river 
When water use is technically inefficient, a significant proportion of the water returns to the 
river for use by others and the environment via surface drainage run-off and from local inter-
connected groundwater systems.  Under present arrangements and at the individual level, most 
irrigation licences are defined as an entitlement to divert or pump a volume of water without 
any regard to the quantity that returns back to the river system either via a surface drain or via 
groundwater (see Figure 1).  Such “savings” from increases in on-farm water-use efficiency have 
been used to expand irrigation.  Importantly, increases in water-use efficiency and most water 
recycling reduce river flow. 
It should be noted, however, that some irrigation areas in NSW and Victoria are already 
receiving “net” bulk entitlements after allowing for reductions in surface drainage return.  This 
means that when one person increases water-use efficiency, water is reallocated to this person 
by reducing allocations to other users.  In Victoria, this is achieved by reducing allocations of 
sales water and in NSW by decreasing allocations to general security irrigators.  There are also 
particular circumstances, such as the Barren Box Swamp in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, 
where surface return flows are probably not significantly affected by increased water-use 
efficiency as unused water does not return to the River (Thompson, 2003, pers. com.).  The 
effects of returns via groundwater systems, however, still need to be considered.  Discussions 
that we have held with many irrigators suggests to us that many, if not most, are not aware of 
the effect of increased water-use efficiency on the volume of water likely to be allocated to them 
in the future ROBUST REFORM 
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The impact of increases in water-use efficiency can be significant.  In the Riverland in SA, it has 
been estimated that an increase in water-use efficiency from 85% to 90% would reduce total 
groundwater inflows to the River Murray by approximately 22% (Australian Water 
Environments, 2003).   
The contribution to return flows from leakage to groundwater by irrigation supply system 
channels is also significant.  With supply system rehabilitation with pipes, such as in the SA 
Riverland, there has been around 30% saving of pumped volumes that have largely been captured 
by the SA Government.  While this has been mostly allocated to expanded irrigation, some is 
being retained as increased environmental river flow.  In aggregate, however, it is clear that pipe 
rehabilitation in the SA Riverland has decreased river flow.  Other investments including the 
replacement of flood and spray irrigation technology with state of the art drip irrigation systems 
can be expected to do likewise.  Indeed, the Water Allocation Plan for the River Murray 
Prescribed Water Course (South Australian Government, 2001) requires that all irrigation in the 
River Murray Irrigation Management Zone (from the Victorian Border to Mannum) achieve 85% 
efficiency. 
Water trading can aggravate the impact of omitting the effect of increased water-use efficiency 
on surface returns and groundwater flow to the river.  Consider, for example, the impact of a 
trade involving the transfer of 1,000 ML of entitlement that was being used to flood-irrigate 
pasture alongside the River Murray near Swan Hill.  Such water is probably being applied to 
pasture at something like 40% water-use efficiency.  This means that when 1,000 ML is pumped 
onto the pasture eventually 600ML would return to the River via surface drains and 
groundwater.  Note the entitlement is defined in terms of the “gross” amount that is pumped 
(1,000 ML) not the net amount that is used (1,000 – 6000 = 400 ML).  Under the Pilot Interstate 
Water Trading Trial, however, it is possible to permanently trade this 1,000 ML of entitlement 
through to the Barossa Valley in South Australia for use in vineyards that are outside the Basin.  
If this 1,000 ML was transferred under the provisions of this trial, then the full 1,000 ML would 
be diverted.  This failure to define entitlements in net rather than gross terms results in an 
increase in use of 600 ML.  The result is either a 600 ML decrease in flow or a 600 ML reduction 
in the volume of water available to other irrigators.  Which of these two outcomes or some 
combination of both of them occurs depends upon allocation policies and trading rules.  The 
effects of these omissions on river flow are illustrated in Figure 1 by the number n. 
Rapid estimation of the magnitude of decreases in flow likely to be caused by increases in water-
use efficiency from 1993/94 is difficult.  There was little information on water-use efficiency 
across the Basin at the time, trading was only just beginning, rapid viticultural development had 
not really started, and there was still considerable scope for laser levelling.  Mean water-use 
efficiency across the Basin during this period, however, was probably low.  The foreshadowed 
removal of impediments to water trading, however, is likely to induce the transfer of a 
considerable volume of water to places where it will be used much more efficiently.  Similarly, 
the reallocation of water from consumptive to environmental purposes, however achieved, is 
likely to be accompanied by considerable investment in increased water-use efficiency.  The 
major omission in this process is the lack of any consideration of the impact of reduced 
groundwater flows to the river.  Significantly, many of the land-use and irrigation development 
effects that ultimately reduce groundwater flow to the River take time to reveal themselves.  
This means that the people who invest in the change tend to perceive that they are not 
responsible for the resultant, albeit delayed, effects on flow. ROBUST REFORM 
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2.2.3  Land-use changes and farm dam development 
Water flow (yield via surface run-off and through groundwater processes) into rivers is also 
being reduced by upper catchment farm dam development, forestry and other forms of land-use 
change.  For example, most volumetric systems do not account for the impact of increased 
forestry and other land-use changes that reduce water yield.  Current estimates of the likely 
impact of the government-endorsed vision of trebling plantation forestry across Australia by 
2020 is expected to reduce flows in the Murray-Darling Basin by around 1,300 GL (Hairsine 
pers. com., 2003).  A detailed review of the science underpinning this issue is contained in a 
paper (Vertessy et al. 2003, forthcoming).  One of the main points made is that it depends where 
plantations are established.  As a general rule, the greater mean rainfall, the more stream flow 
and groundwater recharge is reduced.   
Farm dams have a similar effect.  Essentially, they intercept water that would otherwise reach 
the river and, hence, reduce flow.
6  In recognition of these effects, both New South Wales and 
Victoria have introduced policies that seek to contain the effects of farm dam development on 
water yield.  Similarly, the installation of water recycling systems in a manner that captures 
overland flow is not yet restricted. 
Interestingly, and following a serious drought in mid-1960s, South Africa introduced a regulatory 
system under the Forests Act 1968, effectively controlling the extension of commercial forestry 
by means of an Afforestation Permit System (APS).  The focus was on the protection of the 
national water resources in determining which afforestation permits could be granted or 
withheld (Van der Zel,1995).  Subsequently, a more general Stream Flow Reduction Activity 
(SFRA) Water Use Licensing System was introduced under the National Water Act (1998).  An 
SFRA is defined as any dryland land use practice, which reduces the yield of water from that land 
to downstream water users.  Conditions attached to an SFRA licence, amongst other things, 
relate to protection of the water resource and other existing and potential water users, and for 
practices to limit the reduction of stream flow and other detrimental impacts.  The legislation 
and associated policies and rules allow transferability of SFRA licences between properties.  For 
example, the impact of a proposed afforestation project in the upper zone of catchment on 
stream flow could be off-set by a transfer of an equivalent SFRA licence from down-stream.  
This facility would be particularly important in a catchment with water resources already fully-
allocated and where the proposed development would otherwise most likely be refused. 
Outside the Murray- Darling Basin in the South East of South Australia, there has been 
considerable debate as to the extent of the effects of plantation forestry on the availability of 
groundwater for irrigation.  In this region, it now seems likely that the Government will require 
any future decreases in water yield to be off-set by the purchase and retirement of an equivalent 
irrigation entitlement so that the net impact of any increased forestry or other recharge 
reducing activity is neutral.  The effects of these omissions on river flow are illustrated in Figure 
1 by the number o.   
2.2.4  Salinity interception schemes 
A third omission is associated with salinity interception.  Salinity interception schemes are not 
included in the Cap even though they operate by pumping groundwater to off-river evaporation 
                                            
6   A further effect, not considered in this paper is the effect of farm dams on the timing and pattern of flows 
while they fill.   ROBUST REFORM 
 
Policy and Economic Research Unit  CSIRO Land and Water  Page 21 
basins, which otherwise would have flowed into the River.  While these schemes reduce salt 
flows into the River, groundwater returns to the river are less and, as a result, river flow is less.  
When these schemes were first introduced, it was judged more important to prevent salt in-
flow and fulfil the commitment to keep salinity at Morgan below 800 EC 95 % of the time.  
Nevertheless, a loss of river flow is a cost that should be included in the benefit/cost 
assessments of proposed schemes.  The impact of schemes implemented since 1993/94 through 
the MDBC Salinity and Drainage Strategy and planned for implementation over the next few 
years has been estimated at 40 GL (Close, 2003, pers. com.).  The effect of this omission on 
river flow is illustrated in Figure 1 by the number p. 
2.2.5  Increased groundwater use  
Across the Murray-Darling Basin, groundwater resources remain uncapped, although in many 
regions it is no longer possible to obtain a groundwater licence in those aquifers considered to 
be fully developed.  There are, however, a considerable number of groundwater licences to 
extract water from aquifers in the Basin that are connected to the River and are still to be 
developed.  As surface water markets develop and irrigation water becomes scarcer, those with 
access to reasonable quality groundwater can be expected to take the opportunity to develop 
this water and sell surface water entitlements to others.  Increased “shandying”—the practice of 
mixing saline groundwater with non-saline surface water—can also be expected.  As a result, 
groundwater flow to the River must be expected to decline.  As far as we are aware, estimates 
of the extent of these impacts on flow have not been released by State authorities or the 
MDBC.  Nevertheless, we understand that they are in the vicinity of somewhere between 2 and 
7%.  The effect of this omission on river flow is illustrated in Figure 1 by the number q.  The 
observation that this effect on flows may be significant, however, does raise the question of 
whether or not flow enhancements deliberations should consider securing water from both 
surface and groundwater sources, not just surface water sources. 
2.2.6  Estimate of hydrologic impact 
To illustrate the general magnitude of the impact of these design omissions, Table 1 provides a 
rough estimate of the potential consequences of the omissions discussed above for the River 
Murray System.  The table takes into account foreshadowed water trading reforms and the 
expectation that considerable volumes of water will be returned to the environment (using 
1500 GL as an example).  It should be noted that the estimates have been derived, using 1993/94 
as a baseline, without the benefit of access to sophisticated groundwater models.  We stress 
that more sophisticated modelling is likely to result in significant revision of these estimates.    
(Work under contract to the Murray Darling Basin Commission is presently under way to 
provide more precise estimates.  Nevertheless, we believe that these estimates are of the right 
order of magnitude.) 
Supported by the additional information provided above, the estimates presented in Table 1 are 
those presented earlier in Young and McColl (2003) after considerable consultation with 
groundwater experts and inspection of economic and biophysical information available to them.  
Publication of the estimates produced a significant debate and requests for more detail.  In 
particular, we received a significant number of comments that a particular omission identified 
does not apply in the region that the commentator was interested in.  Interestingly, most of 
these commentators observed that it was true in another part of the Basin.  Having provided the 
opportunity to comment and having supplied more information, we remain confident that the 
overall estimate of the potential net change in mean flow in the River Murray System is of the 
right order of magnitude—especially as several people have drawn our attention to the presence ROBUST REFORM 
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of additional omissions.  It is quite possible that the long run impacts of simply reducing the 
gross volume of water diverted could result in less—not more—water flowing in down the 
River.  Our aim in publishing these preliminary estimates in both this paper and in Young and 
McColl (2003) is to stimulate discussion and research on the important issues raised and, in 
particular, exploration of the most appropriate way to modify existing entitlement and allocation 
systems so that they can be accounted for.   
A second set of comments we received indicated that we should have made it clear that a 
number of arrangements are in place to manage these effects in order to maintain River flow.  
Across the Basin many different entitlement systems are in place.  Conceptually, as each of the 
effects discussed above occur, allocations to should be reduced.  One of the ways of doing this 
in New South Wales is to reduce allocations to those who hold a general security allocation.  In 
Victoria, as each effect occurs sales water allocations should be reduced. 
Table 1  Estimated reduction in mean annual flow and available seasonal allocations of design 
omissions in the entitlement systems used to allocate water in the River Murray Basin 
(baseline 1993/94) 
Design Omission   Net effect 
Reduced drainage and groundwater returns to the River resulting from water use 
efficiency savings 
a) 
- 723 GL 
Reduction in water yield from catchment land-use changes like increased forestry and 
farm dam development
 b) 
- 600 GL 
Reduced groundwater flow to the River as a result of increased installation and operation 
of Salinity Interception Schemes
 c) 
-20 GL 
Reduced groundwater flow to the River from increased groundwater use
 d)  -349 GL 
Estimated net reduction in mean river flow and allocations to irrigators  -1,692 GL 
a)  This assumes that a mean of 8,734 GL is used for consumptive purposes in the River Murray System.  Since 1993/4 there has been 
considerable investment that has sought to increase water-use efficiency.  If 1,500 GL is withdrawn from irrigation, it can be expected that 
irrigators will respond by increasing water-use efficiency further.  It is assumed that the collective long run effect of reduced groundwater 
return, reduced surface water return in those systems where licences are defined in gross not net terms and increased investment in the 
capture and use of run-off will be around 10% of the remaining water.   
b)  It has been estimated that from 2002, increased plantation forestry stimulated by financial incentives will reduce recharge across the entire 
Murray Darling Basin by 1,300GL (Hairsine, pers.  com.; Vertessy et al., 2003).  Assume that this reduces mean flow into the River Murray 
System by 600GL.  The estimate is intentionally conservative.  More accurately, an estimate of the impact from 1993/94 to 2002 could also 
be included.  In our original text we did not include an estimate for farm dam development.  More recent advice to us suggests this impact 
could be as big as that caused by forestry development in high rainfall areas.   
c)  At present, pumping of saline water and its subsequent evaporation as part of a salinity interception scheme is not defined as an extractive 
use which needs to be managed under the cap.  This estimate of 20 GL is also conservative.  The MDBC has since advised that 40 GL is a 
more appropriate estimate of the impact of existing and planned schemes (Close, pers.  com.). 
d)  Results from MDBC studies (currently embargoed) are understood to have estimated that increasing groundwater development will erode 
the Cap by somewhere between 4 and 7%. ROBUST REFORM 
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2.2.7  Climate change 
Another consideration is the prospect of climate change.  Although not included in Table 1, 
none of the arrangements in place are designed to cope with climate change.  A robust 
entitlement and allocation system would, in advance, explicitly indicate how both reductions and 
increases in water availability as a result of climate change would be managed and assign 
responsibility for managing the risk that climate change may occur to water users.  In particular, 
it would make it clear how the risk of climate change is assigned and which irrigators will have 
their allocations reduced as climate changes occur. 
2.2.8  Gap between current licence entitlement and use  
A related consideration is the fact that the Cap, as agreed among States, is on diversions (use) 
not on entitlements.  Historically, licences were issued on the understanding that the water 
allocated would be used in most but not all years.  Administrators typically issued licences so 
that the sum of all licence entitlements is between 10% and 20% over normal usage, and, in 
some groundwater systems, as much as four times normal usage (see Figure 2).  Gaps between 
the volume of entitlements (adjusted for reliability) and the Cap are most pronounced in South 
Australia and New South Wales and appear to be rare in Victoria where entitlement policy has 
been more conservative and sales water is made available to irrigators on a regular basis but 
only when additional water is available.  Where gaps exist, restrictions on trade and seasonal 
allocation policies are used to stop this water being activated.  Generally, as more high security 
water licence entitlements are activated, seasonal allocations of sales water in Victoria and 
general security water in New South Wales are reduced. 
Figure 2  Diversions from the Southern Connected River Murray System, the Sum of all Allocations 
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While the gap between allocation and expected entitlements is being managed at present, its 
presence creates a significant problem for those who aspire to purchase entitlements from 
irrigators and re-assign them to the environment.  There is a real risk that a naïve purchaser of 
environmental water could go into the market and purchase unused entitlements and have little 
if any impact on use.  Supply managers would then have to manage this consequence by reducing 
allocations made to others.  The policy significance of this gap between licence entitlements and 
the Cap is illustrated by the recently announced drought-induced reduction in allocations for 
irrigation water use in SA for 2003/04.  In SA, many irrigators have neither been using all the 
water allocated nor selling it to others.  SA administrators, however, have realised that many 
irrigators have been happy to leave water “in the River” until needed for such drought 
situations.  In recognition of this, SA water administrators have estimated that in order to 
reduce water use by 20% they have to reduce allocations by 35%.  This represents a ratio at the 
margin of 1.7:1.  An associated problem is that when “left in the River”, much of it has actually 
been left in up-stream storage dams and made available to others—including irrigators in other 
States—who have become used to having access to it. 
The introduction of both the Cap and relatively constrained trading has activated unused, dozer 
and sleeper licences.  Removing current impediments to trading has the potential to further 
activate unused water entitlements, and add to the difficulties of managing within the Cap in 
some parts of the system.  This problem would not occur if the Cap was a cap on entitlements, 
rather than a Cap on diversions.  In systems where this approach occurs, any unused water is 
left in the River. 
Clearly, to be effective in the long-term, for any purchase of water entitlements for environment 
the presence of unused allocations in both groundwater and surface water systems must be 
accounted for.  If no account of this is taken, then water entitlements could be purchased either 
from those who are not using them resulting either in no actual impact on river flow or the 
reduction in the volume of allocations previously available to others.  A reasonable assumption is 
that removal of trading impediments plus increased scarcity will activate around 50% of this 
presently unused “cap gap”.  If this occurs and 1,500 GL of entitlements are secured for the 
environment, then we estimate that a further 373 GL of unused entitlement will be activated.  If 
this is accompanied by an offsetting reduction in general security allocations and sales water, 
then there is no flow problem.
7  If, however, every megalitre of entitlement sourced for the 
environment is not accompanied by an equivalent reduction in the Cap, then the net result may 
be a 1,500 GL less 373 GL=1,127 GL. 
2.2.9  Summary of omission effects 
In summary, combining the estimates in Table 1 with the impact of sourcing environmental 
water from consumption without reducing the Cap or without reducing general security, sales 
water and other less secure allocations, could produce a potential net decline in mean flows of 
565 GL (1692 less 1127).  We would not expect this aggregate effect to occur as river managers 
would be forced to reduce the volume of water allocated to less secure entitlement holders.  
How much adjustment occurs will depend heavily upon the arrangements chosen.  In drawing 
attention to the magnitude of these omissions, we observe that the Cap is defined in terms of 
diversion volumes and all the States have agreed to keep use within this limit.  In responding to 
the issues raised in Young and McColl (2003), particularly the potential impact of the activation 
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of unused, dozer and sleeper water, State agencies and irrigation companies have made the point 
that all have agreed and are committed to manage within the Cap.  This is not in dispute.  Our 
point is that the size of the changes necessary to enhance environmental flows are much greater 
than much of the language being used to communicate the challenge before Australia suggest. 
Markets are excellent servants.  Give markets an opportunity to reveal a loophole and they will.  
If governments decide to reduce irrigation entitlements by say 1,500 GL and fail to take action 
to account for the underlying effects of changes in the way water and land are used, in 20 or so 
years time after the impacts of all the design omissions have revealed themselves, the result may 
in the worst of circumstances be less not more water in the River Murray. 
3  Two policy challenges 
The discussion above draws attention to a number of significant policy issues.  Essentially, the 
policy challenges now faced by Australian water resource and environmental managers collapse 
to: 
•  The search for a robust set of institutional arrangements, defined in the broadest sense 
possible, to enable the efficient allocation and management of water resources and both 
consumptive and non-consumptive water use through time; and 
•  The search for an efficient and equitable transition pathway to such a set of institutional 
arrangements. 
In the following two sections, we provide detail of our vision of robust institutional 
arrangements and discuss important aspects of the transitional challenge in moving to such 
arrangements. 
4  Robust institutional arrangements for water allocation and 
management 
4.1  Robustness 
Institutional robustness requires a focus on some new allocation mechanisms and assemblages of 
these mechanisms that differ from those considered by most policy makers at the time a system 
is under review and from those previously encountered.  Robust systems have an architecture 
that can be expected to produce efficient and politically acceptable outcomes in an ever-
changing world (Jen, 2003).  Robust systems persist, are adaptable, and can withstand the test of 
time. 
One of the greatest contributions to thinking about robustness comes from the inaugural Nobel 
Prize laureate in economics – Jan Tinbergen – in the form of the Tinbergen Principle (Tinbergen, 
1950).  The Tinbergen Principle
8 states that to attain a given number of independent policy 
targets there must be, at least, an equal number of policy instruments.   
                                            
8   The Tinbergen Principle is concerned with the possibility that there might be a robust way to efficiently 
manage conflicting issues in a dynamic environment.  Tinbergen identified the necessary conditions for a robust 
solution.  It is necessary to carefully examine the proposed set of instruments to determine whether or not 
the combination of instruments chosen will produce a solution that will stand the test of time. ROBUST REFORM 
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Thus, if arrangements for managing water allocation and use are to be robust, the components 
of existing systems must be separable from one another.  In unseparated systems, whenever any 
problem emerges, the entire system comes under review, negotiations are complex, and an 
opportunity is provided to reopen old agendas.  The clue to the robust resolution of many of 
Australia’s water resource problems lies more with separation than in integration. 
A robust system would need to facilitate: 
•  Resolution of resource allocation between consumptive use and the environment, among 
consumptive users, and of issues related to distribution and use; 
•  Secure, economically efficient and low cost trading and administration; 
•  Assignment of risks making it clear where responsibility lies, under what circumstances 
compensation is due, and specifying the processes for obtaining redress; and 
•  Management of externalities associated with use – the interests of third parties, future 
generations and the environment – with minimum controversy. 
A robust system also must pass the conventional tests of efficiency and fairness.  For this to 
occur in a changing world, the system must not only be built on a solid conceptual foundations, 
but also be flexible and adaptive, transparent and equitable. 
4.2  Balancing market and non-market uses 
In the past, it has been common for legislators to grant absolute priority to the environment, 
transport and recreation, and only licence access to the remainder.  Thus, licences were 
allocated for a term and Ministers empowered to reduce allocations without compensation.  
Performance criteria associated with this prior assignment, however, are vague.  The first-best 
solution would be to define a set of minimum baseline river flow conditions.  As suggested by 
Peter Cullen and others, this process could be implemented via the development of a river 
classification system that identifies rivers as heritage, conservation or working rivers (Jones, 
2003).  Once this higher-level classification system is in place, mechanisms are needed to allow 
river managers to make seasonal and daily trade-offs as supply conditions and both 
environmental and consumptive demand conditions change.  In the long run, dynamically efficient 
water use requires either a very flexible rule-based cap or a structure that allows administrators 
to “trade” environmental allocations with consumptive water users.  One dynamic option is to 
place some or even all environmental access entitlements in an independent environmental trust 
and then allow the trust’s trustees to trade counter-cyclically, selling some allocations in a 
drought and purchasing allocations, presumably at a lesser cost per megalitre, in wetter years.  
Profits made from this counter-cyclic trading could be used either to buy more allocations or to 
buy additional entitlements. 
4.3  Water access entitlements, allocations and use conditions 
In 1994, CoAG recommended separation of water licences from land title, allowing water access 
entitlements and allocations to be deployed to uses generating greater economic returns.  Faced 
with the requirement to deliver water trading or lose access to Commonwealth money, most 
States chose simply to bolt water-trading arrangements onto existing licence systems, with little 
attention to investment security, water quality and river health implications.  The result has been ROBUST REFORM 
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the emergence of a host of new problems that are, amongst other things, the focus of a recent 
report to CoAG (NRMC, 2003). 
CoAG introduced the words “property rights” into the performance requirements imposed on 
States in 1994.  In retrospect, the use of this “economic jargon” has been interpreted by some 
parties as implying the creation of compensable property rights.  Similarly, “clear specification of 
entitlements in terms of ownership, volume, reliability, transferability and, if appropriate, quality” 
has been misinterpreted as an instruction for States to guarantee volume and to ensure that 
changes necessary to effectively regulate negative externalities, accommodate changes in social 
values, and maintain river health will be compensable.  As we have stressed elsewhere in Young 
and McColl (2002), the more efficient approach is to fully specify interests and risks and then 
transparently distribute responsibility for managing these risks among the parties involved.  
Some risks are most appropriately managed by private investors and some by the government.  
Very few are most efficiently managed by failure to fully specify them and failure to communicate 
the nature of them to water users. 
Building upon this concept of fully specifying risk, and upon the Tinbergen Principle, the features 
of a robust set of water-licensing arrangements separated from land title have been identified 
(Young and McColl, 2002).  Key characteristics of the proposed system include: 
1.  Formal unit shares issued in perpetuity and defined as an unequivocally guaranteed, 
mortgageable claim to a proportional share of any periodic water distributions; 
2.  Separate management of all distributions using low-cost bank-like accounting and trading 
protocols that define the quantity that may be traded or used in “net” not “gross” terms; 
3.  Independent authorisation of irrigation via use licences that reserve pollution rights to 
the Crown and define all duties associated with water use at a site in a manner that 
remains consistent with conditions expressed in statutory catchment management plans 
(see Figure 2); and 
4.  Provision for definition of the amount of water allocated for environmental purposes 
partly as a prior right and, where appropriate, partly as a tradeable allocation enabling an 
environmental manager or trustee to decide when and if a water allocation may be sold 
to a consumptive water user, left in the system for the benefit of recreational users, or 
used for the production of ecosystem benefits or to maintain estuaries. 
In several States, the reform processes underway are consistent with many of these 
characteristics.  New South Wales, for example, has begun the process of separating access 
entitlements from use entitlements and all States have begun the process of pricing reform. 
Robust design principles also require that careful attention be given to the allocation hierarchies.  
In many parts of Australia, entitlements and licences have been distributed both to water supply 
companies and trusts in the form of a bulk licence and to irrigators as an individual use licence.  
Robust systems recognise that only one interest can be primary.  All other interests must be 
defined via an encumbrance on the water access entitlement or use licence.  From an efficiency 
perspective, it does not matter whether the primary interest is held by a water supply company 
periodically selling water to irrigators, or by individual irrigators.  Either way, each party can be 
expected to contract with the other party to gain access to the services they require.  If 
irrigators are the primary holders, bulk access entitlements are unnecessary for all but supply 
system losses.   ROBUST REFORM 
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Other design detail includes options to enable trade between surface and groundwater and for 
the development of markets for channel capacity (with entitlement shares) and salinity (with use 
licences).  Where annual and perennial land-use systems coincide, there is an option for high 
security and general security entitlement shares to be issued. 
There is also a need to carefully consider whether or not entitlements should be defined as 
share of the entire system or part of the system.  If entitlements are not defined as shares of the 
entire system then in a trading environment arbitrate opportunities emerge as people trade to 
take advantage of flawed exchange rates and systems reviews.  One pragmatic way of dealing 
with this problem is to introduce tagged entitlement systems so that the exchange rate risks and 
reform risks cannot be passed via a trading system to others.  Under such a tagged arrangement, 
a Murrumbidgee entitlement would always remain a Murrumbidgee entitlement even though it 
was being used and had been used in South Australia or Victoria for many years.  The 
administrative costs of managing such a system could become considerable.  Clearly, the fewer 
the tags the cheaper the system will be to administer and the easier it will be to communicate 
implications of any changes in exchange rates and system charges to entitlement holders.  
Deciding upon the optimal number of types of entitlement is a non-trivial issue that requires 
very careful analysis.  Clearly, the optimal number of entitlements for the entire Murray-Darling 
System is not one.  The question that CoAG is now asking Australia to decide is how many 
should there be and what form should they take? 
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4.4  Pricing 
The value of access entitlements and periodic allocations is determined by market prices, market 
costs, charges, levies and rates imposed by governments, and the impact of regulations.  One 
interesting feature of nearly all water allocation systems used in Australia, is the fact that 
governments have sought to capture very few of the economic rents embodied in water access 
entitlements.  If they did seek to collect all these rents by, for example, auctioning periodic 
allocations as they became available, many of the current policy problems would not have 
arisen.
9 
With regard to pricing, CoAG has recommended previously and just reaffirmed that water, as a 
minimum, should be supplied to consumptive users at full cost of supply, including the cost of 
externalities.  It is assumed that CoAG meant the marginal and not average cost of supply of 
water for consumptive use and is not concerned about recovering the costs of previous 
investments from current water users.  Presumably, CoAG also intended that costs of supplying 
water for non-consumptive uses would continue to be met from consolidated revenue as a 
community service obligation. 
4.5  Managing Externalities 
Siebert et al. (2000) identified three types of externalities associated with water use: supply 
externalities caused by dam construction and consequent changed and reduced flows etc; local 
use externalities associated with run-off, draw-down of neighbouring supplies; and return 
externalities such as caused by the return of polluted water to a river.  They observe that, in 
many if not most cases, externalities are more efficiently managed using instruments other than 
the supply price.  With few exceptions, water is an input into production and consumption 
processes.  As a general rule, if specific externality outcomes relating to use can be defined and 
sought, then industry could be left to find the most efficient and least cost way to deliver them.  
In summary, the marginal cost of supply externalities will be efficiently reflected in the supply 
price, whereas the cost of other externalities relating to use are more efficiently signalled to 
water users via mechanisms encouraging them to reduce their incidence on a location by 
location and business by business basis. 
One way of efficiently signalling the costs to others imposed by externalities is to define an 
environmental duty of care in a way that signals how the performance outcomes sought can be 
expected to change through time.
10  As recommended to the High Level Steering Group on 
                                            
9   From a government revenue perspective, CoAG’s recommendation to separate water access entitlements 
from land title is raising an interesting challenge for local government.  Full separation of water from land 
means that the rateable value for the remaining land is significantly less.  Given the national commitment to 
separation and that the status quo for revenue collection by local government is to be maintained, either the 
unit rate could be increased on land used for irrigation, or local government empowered to levy water use.
9  
Another approach could be for States to introduce a return-to-the-community mechanism similar to that 
permitted under NSW fishing legislation (Young, 1999) whereby a proportion of each water access 
entitlement would be resumed each year and then sold by auction or tender.  If a 2% rent is to be collected, 
then 2% of each entitlement needs to be resumed and sold each year and the proceeds go to consolidated 
revenue.   
10   On the advice of the High Level Steering Group, the Duty of Care was changed to Environmental 
Responsibility raising the question of whether or not the many legal precedents associated with the notion of 
duty of care should apply without qualification to water use.   ROBUST REFORM 
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Water (Siebert et al., 2000), for externalities to be costed it is necessary first for governments 
to define a minimum duty of care against which obligations can be measured.  As a general 
concept, duty of care can lead to more efficient outcomes than a pure regulatory approach as 
duties of care are written as prescribed outcomes.  Operationally, regulations can only prevent 
actions leading to undesirable outcomes, whereas a duty of care reverses the onus of 
responsibility and obliges actions to be taken to achieve desired outcomes.  For example, South 
Australia’s proposed River Murray Act will require a person to “take all reasonable measures to 
prevent or minimise any harm to the River Murray” (s.22).  Duties of care would be defined in 
periodically revised catchment plans with site-specific operational detail incorporated in the 
individual use licence.  Pollution permit trading among individuals through either offset 
arrangements or a full cap and trade permit system will lead to the most efficient outcomes. 
In summary, it is most efficient to include the cost of supply externalities in the prices charged 
for the supply of water.  Outcomes will be more efficient if other instruments are used to signal 
the cost of local use effects, and downstream externalities caused by the return of water to the 
environment.  Under such a model, and as illustrated in Figure 2, a downstream externality 
could be managed via the introduction of separate pollution emission entitlement and allocation 
systems.  In some situations, a case can be made for the provision of transition assistance to 
encourage development of new technology and attain speedier acceptance (see Figure 3).  It is 
critical also that those water users failing to either offset impacts or to meet defined obligations 
are penalised. 
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5  A transitional pathway 
5.1  Sequencing 
Australian water politicians are currently showing a preference for the removal of impediments 
to permanent water access entitlement trading and securing additional environmental flows for 
the River Murray System and other stressed river and groundwater systems.  Money has been 
allocated to the Murray-Darling Basin and is being invested in an effort to restore flows to the 
Snowy River and the recently announced National Water Initiative has assigned a new $500 
million to address over-allocation issues in the Murray Darling Basin.  The presence of market 
impediments, even given the comparative absence of externality cost obligations, means that the 
value of water access entitlements, allocations and use licences are less than they would 
otherwise be.  In over-allocated systems, like the River Murray, the result is a sequencing 
opportunity and a sequencing trap.  Remove market impediments to permanent trading before a 
robust entitlement and allocation system is put in place, and the cost of reform increases – 
especially if all water is to be purchased using a voluntary offer or similar market-like schemes.  
However, if water is secured for the environment at the same time as market impediments are 
removed and entitlements are respecified, then the net market gains to entitlement holders 
from this process can be used to lessen the need for transitional assistance payments.  Clawing 
back recently acquired gains from a community without compensation, irrespective of whether 
justifiable or not, is a politically difficult process.  Especially once a precedence of using market-
like processes has been set. 
Failure to pursue these reform sequencing opportunities and, in particular, to implement the 
politically easy options without addressing the underlying flaws is likely to result in the 
emergence of problems that will hinder opportunities to make further progress.  As a general 
rule, it will be less costly for governments to acquire additional water to enhance the 
environment before impediments to permanent water trading are removed and before a new 
robust water access entitlement and allocation system is put in place. 
5.2  Developing water-related markets 
In most parts of Australia, market and market-like arrangements for water access entitlements 
and use licences are in their infancy and characterised by arrangements that are designed to 
prevent trade from resulting in the movement of water into highly saline areas and to ensure 
that existing delivery expectations can be met.  Private markets for access to channel capacity 
during peak periods and salinity impacts are virtually non-existent.  Market arrangements that 
allow counter-cyclic trading of water environmental allocations do not exist.  As a result, the 
removal of so-called market impediments to regional and interstate trading without the 
development of the new market arrangements could result in the emergence of a new set of 
water quality and adjustment problems.  In short, the simple removal of trading restrictions 
without the introduction of new control mechanisms could result in the Basin trading into not 
out of trouble. 
Within regions, the main reason for current restrictions on temporary trading with consequent 
high transaction costs relates to the need to check that a temporary trade will not generate 
increased environmental impacts, and to ensure that the traded water can be delivered.  
Between regions and types of licence, the necessary checks remain similar but require more 
time consuming coordination among agencies, regional offices and officers.  A further problem, ROBUST REFORM 
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as described earlier for Murrumbidgee Irrigation, relates to the difficulty in some parts of the 
system of managing the activation of unused, sleeper and dozer water within the requirement of 
the CAP on diversions. 
Nevertheless, separation of water access entitlements and use licences, as is happening in NSW, 
opens up opportunities to sequence implementation enabling economic progress with an 
understanding that further reforms will follow.  It allows the management of environmental 
issues independently from the investment issues with water managed as an input to production.  
Moreover, if the intent and direction of these subsequent reforms is signalled with clarity it may 
be possible to minimise downside risk for investment.  In particular, the so called “temporary” 
market – the market for periodic allocations – can be developed with little downside risk to the 
community of water users as exchange rates can be varied by regulation from year to year and 
investors understand that no long term commitment has been made.  Thus, there is a strong 
case for developing the within-region and within-type of water licence temporary trading system 
as quickly as possible and so speed up opportunities for structural adjustment.  For maximum 
short-term efficiency, the focus should be on decreasing transaction costs and reducing the time 
for settlement.  This requires, among other things, establishment of bank-like accounts 
accessible over the internet, and facilitation of internet-based trading. 
If use licences set a limit on the maximum amount of water that can be applied to a specific 
location, for example, to minimise salinity impact, then allocation trading could be left to market 
processes.  Between-region and between-licence-system exchange rates would need to be 
announced periodically in a manner consistent with an expectation that they will change as 
reforms progress. 
Such a temporary-market and use-licence focus would make it abundantly clear where exchange 
rate and system omission risks reside (with the person who invests on the assumption that 
water can be traded).  The leasing of a water access entitlement for several years would be 
possible without any need for governments to register and control such commercial 
arrangements.  Governments would only process transfers once exchange rates for a specific 
trading period had been announced.  Similarly, catchment management plans could begin to put 
in place salinity, and other, offset arrangements to ensure that resultant environmental impacts 
of land-use change remain acceptable. 
As discussed earlier, the risks associated with a “sequence trap” emerging lie with actions that 
remove impediments to so-called “permanent trading” without first removing the underlying 
flaws in existing water management systems.  Whenever a permanent trade occurs, the market 
price paid reflects the value of the opportunity to exploit all existing flaws in perpetuity.  
Whenever a temporary trade occurs the market price paid reflects only the value of the 
opportunity to exploit the flaw in that year. 
In all fully allocated systems, the further development of seasonal allocations (temporary trading) 
coupled with a freeze on the expansion of access entitlement (permanent) trading could be used 
to limit arbitrage opportunities until robust accounting systems are put in place.  Otherwise, 
administrators must expect the cost of structural adjustment and transitional payments to be 
much higher than otherwise would be the case.  There are economies of scale in reform 
processes.  As a general principle, the more reforms undertaken at once, the lower the total 
transaction costs and opportunities for arbitrage. 
An interesting way of facilitating permanent trade without the reassignment of risk is to tag all 
water entitlements by the region they are sourced from.  If this is done, then the volume of ROBUST REFORM 
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allocations that attach to that entitlement at any location would always be calculated by 
reference to the place from which the entitlement came from and the exchange rates that 
operate at each allocation period.  This mechanism makes it clear that the risk associated with 
any trade would always be assigned to the person who purchases the entitlement and not the 
system as a whole. 
If arrangements are not put in place to ensure seamless alignment of the number of unit shares 
in the system with its hydrological capacity, ongoing problems can be expected to emerge.  As 
an absolute minimum, water use should be defined in “net” not “gross” terms, arrangements 
should be put in place to ensure that the effects of land-use changes like forestry development 
and farm dam construction are offset.  The effects of activating unused groundwater and surface 
water access entitlements also need to be accounted for. 
Finally, the process of dealing with each licence is expensive as most involve third parties and 
complex registration procedures.  As robust systems guarantee the nature of all dealings 
associated with an entitlement and/or a use licence, these transaction costs are significant.  In 
many cases, and as mentioned earlier it will also be advantageous to reduce the number of types 
of entitlement listed.  With few exceptions, there is little justification for more than two types of 
entitlement—a high security entitlement and a general security entitlement.  With two types of 
entitlement, water users can mix the two options to manage allocation risk.  Some regional 
tagging may also be justified but as more and more regional tags are introduced the cost and 
complexity of the resultant system must be expected to increase exponentially. 
5.3  Developing markets for environmental quality 
Existing market impediments largely exist due to the absence of the suite of markets needed for 
efficient protection, maintenance and, where appropriate, improvement of environmental values.  
Rather than trying to specify and develop all of these markets, governments have used 
administrative processes.  A National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality is being 
implemented through a program of on-ground works and investments attempting to address 
outcomes essentially arising from the failure of administrative mechanisms to manage 
externalities.   
Two important missing markets are those enabling the efficient management of salinity and of 
environmental flows.  The downstream implications of these two are interdependent.  Increased 
environmental flow produces a lower concentration of salt and less saline groundwater 
intrusion. 
At present, markets for salinity are very imperfect and, in fact, in most areas legislation prevents 
individual landholders from accessing them.  In the Murray–Darling Basin, for example, a salinity 
register exists but is only accessible to States and legislation requires that States be given a right 
of first refusal to purchase any salinity credits available.  Private individuals therefore have little 
incentive to invest in salinity reduction.  In particular, there is no direct management incentive 
for an existing irrigator, whose actions impose high salinity or other costs on downstream water 
users, to change practice.  As a result, salinity continues to get worse.  In the same way as it 
makes sense to cap water and allow individuals to trade allocations, so it makes economic sense 
to cap salinity impacts and allow individuals to trade them. 
Efficiency criteria would suggest that to the extent that current salinity impact comes from 
existing land-use practice, these arrangements should be changed as a matter of priority.  While 
the introduction of a transparent market for such salinity management is a major step, it could ROBUST REFORM 
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be expected to produce considerable benefits at low cost to government.  Work on the 
development of such salinity markets is in its infancy.  Consistent with the robust water 
entitlement and allocation principles, we suggest immediate introduction of 100% offset 
arrangements for all new irrigation development.  This should be followed by the grandfathering 
of existing practice through the distribution of salinity emission units to all water users, with the 
reduction of these grandfathered units at a small percentage each year.  A salinity manager, 
possibly the same entity as the river flow manager, could then decide whether or not to 
surrender them or sell them.  The salinity manager could also accept water access entitlements 
or periodic allocations as offsets in lieu of salinity credits to the extent that the same 
environmental outcome can be achieved at less cost. 
5.4  Securing environmental flows 
At least in the short term, for groundwater and river systems that are not over-allocated, 
existing systems can be retained and run conservatively.  However, if markets are allowed to 
operate in over-allocated and over-used systems, ultimately water access entitlements need to 
be reduced and/or supply reliability reduced.  A number of mechanisms are available to reduce 
entitlements.  They can be divided into two groups—those that involve an administrative change 
and those that operate through the water market or at least involve market-like processes. 
The suite of administrative processes available include: 
1.  A pro rata reduction implemented administratively by reducing expected reliability 
and/or, in Victoria, by reducing the volume of water periodically offered for sale; 
2.  A pro rata reduction in the volume stated on each licence; 
3.  Compulsory acquisition of either a proportion of each licence or closure of specific 
categories of water use and/or areas of irrigation. 
Market and market-like mechanisms include 
4.  Acquisition of water licences using, for example, open-market, voluntary-tender  or 
compulsory-offer mechanisms; 
5.  Negotiated contracts involving investment by government in infrastructure upgrades 
(supply system and/or on-farm) in return for surrender of all or part of one or more 
licences. 
Each option has its benefits, its costs, its equity and its political implications.  In practice, a mix of 
approaches is probably most appropriate.  Pro rata reduction approaches can be expected to 
increase market activity and incur deadweight transaction costs as those who cannot afford to 
give up water buy it back.  In systems where two or more types of licence exist it is possible to 
reduce the reliability of a sub-set of licences.  It is, for example, possible to just reduce cap and, 
as a result, reduce general security and sales water allocations. 
Whatever pro rata approach is taken, following implementation the most economically efficient 
water users can be expected to purchase water access entitlements or allocations from less 
efficient water users and from those simply investing and trading in entitlements and allocations.   
Pro rata reduction by licence volume is administratively costly as each licence has to be physically 
amended and registers in most states are not yet fully electronic.  Legislation, however, could be ROBUST REFORM 
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put in place to enable these changes to be made whenever a licence is dealt with for another 
purpose and/or is replaced with a robust one.  If pro rata reduction of each licence is combined 
with re-issue of a robust access entitlement and use licence, total administrative costs will be 
less as double handling would not be necessary. 
The lowest market acquisition approach known is the compulsory offer mechanism.  First 
introduced in the United States for sulphur trading this mechanism is perhaps the most efficient 
of all known mechanisms.  It involves the introduction of legislation requiring all entitlement 
holders to make an offer to sell a proportion of the entitlement they hold for sale.  While it is 
compulsory to make an offer for, say 2% of all entitlements held, the holder is free to set as a 
higher reserve price as they like.  The purchasing authority, normally, a government authority 
then inspects all offers made and announces the buy-back price.  All entitlement holders whose 
reserve price is less than the buy-back price then receive the buy-back price for the quantity 
they offered.  The result is the rapid emergence of a deep and mature market characterised by 
lower transaction costs than any other voluntary market process can deliver (Young et al., 
2002).  Sophisticated selection and incentive-for-cooperation approaches can be used in 
combination with this mechanism so that impacts on water quality and water supply costs are 
also considered.  In some areas, for example, the most efficient outcome may involve offering an 
additional payment when all the licences along a supply channel are surrendered and that 
channel can be closed.  Clearing prices would need to vary by licence type and the use that 
water is put to.  Where serious “gross/net” flaws exist, the total costs of reducing any over-
allocation problem may be lower if a higher price per unit is paid for volumes secured from the 
least efficient water users so that volume negative impacts on river flow are minimised. 
An interesting variant of this compulsory offer process is that being used in Australia by Telstra 
as they seek to buy-back shares to the value of between $800 and $1,000 million via a 
completely voluntary process.  The approach they are using is to write to every share holder 
and invite them to offer to sell any number of shares that they wish to by a range of prices.  All 
shares purchased by Telstra will be at the announced buy-back price even if the amount offered 
was less than that price.  
As the above Telstra system is a voluntary one any purchase by them could leave the seller with 
a capital gains liability.  A significant feature of compulsory acquisition systems is that special 
capital gains tax provisions apply. For many entitlement holders such preferential taxation 
arrangements could prove attractive – especially if the water entitlements were acquired after 
the 19
th September 1985. Compulsory acquisition powers, if granted, could also prove a 
particularly attractive option in areas where, as a result of environmental flow enhancement and 
water trading, much of a supply channel is no longer used.   
Contracts involving the upgrade of supply or on-farm infrastructure in return for the surrender 
of water access entitlements are possible but, unless there are significant imperfections in the 
local water market, the outcomes sought could be more efficiently achieved by simply 
purchasing water access entitlements and leaving water managers to upgrade infrastructure etc 
and thereby realise potential from upgrading some infrastructure.  Private investors and water 
users would then make the necessary changes in competition with all other competing 
investments without the need for governments to get involved.  One significant income taxation 
imperfection that we are aware of is the differential taxation arrangements that apply to water 
supply companies and primary producers.  At present and as we understand it, water supply 
companies can not gain primary producer status and, hence, can not depreciate and write-off the 
cost of upgrading infrastructure as quickly as primary producers.  This places these companies at 
a competitive disadvantage. ROBUST REFORM 
 
Policy and Economic Research Unit  CSIRO Land and Water  Page 36 
Interestingly, the recent CoAG decision and announcement of a National Water Initiative 
implies, through the announcement of new funding of $500 million, that governments are willing 
to at least commence the process of securing additional water for allocation to environmental 
processes via the use of market and market-like mechanisms.  Ultimately, however, it must be 
expected that the mix of mechanisms chosen will mainly depend on the volumes of water and 
the proposed timeline of securing, the expected flow of available finance, and the institutional 
arrangements set in place to not only to secure but also to manage environmental water to 
achieve the most beneficial environmental outcomes.  How these aspects will be dealt with will 
be for the relevant governments to resolve in consultation with stakeholders and the 
community.   
5.5  Financing delivery of a robust system and restoration of river 
health 
The extent of the net financial impact of entitlement reduction and upgrade to a robust 
entitlement and allocation system will depend both on the volume secured for the environment 
and the extent and nature of the existing imperfections.  Clearly, the aggregate package should 
seek to equate marginal social benefits with marginal social costs (Freebairn, 2003) using 
valuation techniques that account for the consequences of consumptive and non-consumptive 
uses. 
If market and market-like mechanisms are used, then the financial resources necessary will need 
to be sourced.  Determining how much of the cost of securing environmental water should be 
borne by water licence holders and how much by the rest of the community is a distributional 
policy issue.  Significant benefits from the suggested reforms will flow to irrigators in the form of 
valuable, fully specified and fully tradeable water access entitlements and allocations.   
A major challenge is to choose the fairest process to follow and this depends in part upon 
interpretation of the actual and implied rights of entitlement holders and the communities 
dependent upon the nature of these allocations.  In recognition of the merits of securing water 
at current market prices, operationally any first tranche could be purchased up-front.  The size 
and speed of program implementation should then be determined by the level of funds provided 
by governments and the environmental benefits being achieved, rather than by an up-front policy 
commitment to secure a particular volume. 
5.6  Water market and access entitlement reform 
As indicated above, separation of access entitlement and use systems into their components 
opens up opportunities to sequence implementation.  In particular, it provides an opportunity to 
speed development of the so-called “temporary” market and freeze, at least, expansion of the 
permanent market for access entitlements until hydrological omissions are corrected and 
governments are in a position to roll-out their plan for the introduction of “a robust framework 
for water access entitlements that encourages investment and maximises the economic value 
created from water use” and “a robust, transparent regulatory water accounting framework that 
protects the integrity of entitlements.”  
Under such a new robust system one would expect that trade in allocations would occur in 
“net” not “gross” terms.  Once such an arrangement was in place, then unencumbered 
allocation (temporary) trading could be allowed across the entire system using periodically 
revised exchange rates.  All long-term risks would remain with present licence holders.  In 
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flow to be brought into the trading and allocation system.  For example, any person installing a 
farm dam or establishing a new plantation would be required to off-set the impact on other 
licence holders by acquiring and surrendering an entitlement equivalent to the assessed impact 
of the proposed land-use change.  
Decisions need to be made on the volume of water to be secured for environmental services, 
the methods to be used to source it, and on the most appropriate way to manage environmental 
flows.   
The access component of each licence then needs to be converted into access entitlement 
shares and institutional arrangements to manage the long-term sustainable relationship between 
environmental flows and consumption at both the catchment and basin levels need to be put in 
place. 
Dealing with access licences is administratively expensive as guaranteed registers need to be 
established and each mortgagee and each interested party needs to be contacted.  In many cases, 
it will be advantageous as part of this process to reduce the number of types of entitlement 
listed.  As indicated earlier, with few exceptions, there is little justification for more than two 
types of access licence; high security and general security.  Once two levels of reliability are in 
place, water users can mix the two entitlements to achieve whatever degree of reliability they 
prefer.  As access entitlement risks are most efficiently pooled at the scale that they occur, 
entitlement shares should be issued across connected water resources and not by state or 
administrative region.   
Finally, markets for salinity and other water quality impacts, and for channel capacity can be 
developed.  At present, markets for salinity are very imperfect.  Salinity impact permits need to 
be separated from use licences.  Once again, we suggest the issuance of shares and 
allocations (see Figure 2). 
In summary, the reform program can be undertaken as a series of steps as follows: 
First, separate water use licences from water access entitlements as is happening in NSW 
and is foreshadowed. 
Second, facilitate temporary market trading with appropriate trading rules and periodically 
revised exchange rates with a focus on increasing opportunities for internet trading, 
lowering transaction costs and reducing settlement times. 
Third, temporarily freeze expansion of the permanent trade of access entitlements until 
the access component of each licence is converted into a shares defined in a manner that 
defines use in “net” not “gross” terms and accounts for the effects of all forms of land use 
change that reduce water yield and the interconnectedness of ground and surface water 
systems or, alternatively, tagging all permanent trades so that it is clear that any future 
changes in exchange rates, etc would be at the risk of the person who purchases the 
entitlement. 
Fourth, decide on the volume of water to be secured for environmental services, the 
methods to be used to source it, and the approach to management of such water. 
Fifth, put in place institutional arrangements to hold “new” environmental allocations and 
manage the long-term sustainable relationship between environmental flows and 
consumption at both the catchment and basin levels. ROBUST REFORM 
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Sixth, decide on the most appropriate way to convert the access component of each 
licence into access entitlement shares, and remove impediments to the permanent trade in 
access entitlements with appropriate trading rules and periodically revised exchange rates. 
Seventh, provide for the development of markets for salinity and other water quality 
impacts, for channel capacity through the issuance of shares and allocations, and for the 
development of secondary water market products. 
Finally, allow conversion of all entitlements to resultant robust entitlement, allocation and 
trading system. 
5.7  Governance 
Institutional separation of access entitlements, allocations and use conditions enables 
management at different scales with management of interactions among them largely via market 
rather than administrative processes.  Significantly, robust systems seek to internalise problems 
so that those finding an administrative flaw seek to fix the problem rather than exploit it to the 
disadvantage of others.  The responsibility and accountability for decisions should be located 
with the objective of maximising dynamic and institutional efficiency. 
Water access entitlements therefore need to be defined by catchment, allowing climate change 
and other similar risks to be collectively shared among the pool of shareholders interested in 
the long-term fate of the water supply system.  Generally, the inevitable trade-offs between 
environmental and economic objectives are most efficiently managed at the catchment level 
nested within formally assigned limits set by Basin managers who need to ensure that these 
trade-offs do not compromise the interest of other upstream and downstream water users and 
the needs of the environment. 
Annual allocations can be made only after the quantity of water available for consumptive use is 
established.  In complex systems, like those in the Murray Darling Basin, the quantity available 
for use will depend, among other things, upon the extent of the transmission losses.  Exchange 
rates will have to be varied regularly by a river manager at the reach level as market and 
biophysical systems change.   
It is also important to consider how any water access entitlements secured for the environment 
are managed.  A preferred option is for all water secured for the environment to be placed in an 
independent Basin-wide trust empowered to maximise environmental outcomes.  This could 
involve selling some environmental allocations in drought periods when the price of a seasonal 
allocation tends to be very high and environmental needs are less and then using the resultant 
money to buy back more water in wetter periods when the irrigator demand for water is less.  
Typically, the value of a water allocation to water user is greatest in a drought and least in wet 
years.  The value of water to the environment, however, will often be the reverse.  For example, 
applying wetting and drying cycles for particular wetlands may be in reverse. Thus, there is 
opportunity for a responsible environmental manager to trade environmental allocations that 
are to the mutual benefit of both the environment and irrigators.  This counter-cyclic trading 
opportunity could even be used to gradually increase the environmental entitlements.  The 
result would be a more efficient social outcome—increased environmental outcomes and 
increased opportunities for the irrigation sector. 
It is also important to consider how any water access entitlements secured for the environment 
are managed.  Our preferred option is for all water secured for the environment to be placed in ROBUST REFORM 
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an independent trust empowered to maximise environmental outcomes by trading water.  
Counter-cyclic trading could then be used to produce a more efficient social outcome.  As a 
general rule, rivers need floods and droughts.  It is possible to imagine situations where it would 
be beneficial for an environmental trust to sell some environmental allocation water in a drought 
and then buying more water back in a subsequent year.   
Use conditions and obligations to others and to the environment occur at two levels: system-
wide, associated with distant downstream impacts; and local, characterised by impacts on 
neighbouring businesses, the local community and local environments.  Efficient management 
Basin-wide requires assignment of outcome performance targets (both quantity and quality) that 
downstream local water-use managers are both responsible and accountable for delivering.  In 
most Australian States, the logical local water-use manager is either the catchment management 
authority or local government authorities appropriately scaled and resourced and with 
boundaries aligned to coincide with catchment boundaries.  These use-control arrangements 
need not be administered centrally.  Indeed, we can envisage a situation where a River Manager 
has to negotiate with several trusts. 
In a perfect world, separated governance can occur via one of two models: a conventional 
delegation of powers model; or a devolved model described by the European Community as a 
subsidiarity model.  Under the subsidiarity model, all powers held at the basin, state or national 
level are granted to catchment management authorities.  Central authorities retain the right to 
call in powers and functions more efficiently managed at the central level, but if and only if, this 
fact can be demonstrated.  Under this model, catchment management plans become statutory 
instruments designed to regulate use and catchment authorities have access and opportunity to 
trial and use the full range of market-based and other instruments available in most States only 
to central government. 
6  Concluding comments 
Australian Governments are now committed to the introduction of a suite of robust water 
entitlement, water trading and water accounting mechanisms.  The extent of the net financial 
impact of entitlement reduction and upgrade to a robust entitlement, allocation and use system 
will depend both on the volume secured for environmental purposes and the extent and nature 
of the existing imperfections.  Clearly, the aggregate package should seek to equate marginal 
social benefits with marginal social costs (Freebairn, 2003 ) using valuation techniques that 
account for the consequences of market and non-market preferences.   
If market and market-like mechanisms are used to address over-allocation issues, then the 
financial resources necessary will need to be sourced, and, if our recommendations are 
accepted, placed in one or more trusts.  Determining how much financial burden should be 
borne by water licence holders and how much by the rest of the community is a distributional 
issue and one that is critically dependent upon how decisions about how design omissions from 
present entitlement systems are managed.   
With regard to the over-allocation issues, one pragmatic option is to start with acquisition via 
market and market-like processes and only proceed to other options as entitlements rise in 
value.  Significant benefits from the suggested reforms, however, can be expected to flow to 
irrigators and other entitlement holders in the form of valuable, fully specified and fully tradeable 
water access entitlements and allocations recorded in a register whose integrity is unequivocally 
guaranteed.   ROBUST REFORM 
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As Australia embraces the challenge and opportunity given to it by CoAG, it will be important to 
identify the fundamental design characteristics of robust water entitlement, allocation and use 
control.  These include arrangements that ensure continuous alignment between entitlements 
and the quantity of water available for use, full specification and assignment of risk, and 
separation or removal of use control from entitlement definition.  If the reforms now being 
pursued by Australia get the fundamental design characteristics right, as a result we should have 
a set of robust arrangements capable of withstanding the test of time and make Australia the 
undisputed world leader in the management and allocation of water resources. 
Choice of procedural process and sequencing, and style of communication with irrigators is 
critically important.  As governments begin the process of securing water for the environment, 
irrigators will be less inclined to leave water in the river.  At present, around 10 – 20% of water 
is neither traded nor used!  Failure to address the fundamentals of system design could result in 
outcomes that are worse than those already occurring.  Our estimates suggest that the sum of 
the flow losses caused by existing hydrological flaws are greater than the volumes likely to be 
secured for the River Murray in the near future.  Unless these design emissions are dealt with 
openly and transparently, the situation could get worse not better.  Markets, especially ones 
allowing trade in administratively defined opportunities with inadequate attention given to detail, 
have an uncanny ability to trade systems into, not out of, trouble. 
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